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Board diversity has been a hot topic for several years. However, it is only in 
recent years that pertinent questions have been asked about what is actually 
meant by board diversity and what would constitute a board with an ideal 
diversity. In the past the debate on board diversity has always been dominated 
by the lack, or very low numbers, of females on boards. This has been a fact in 
most countries with sophisticated corporate law and corporate governance 
systems in place. The issue of female representation on boards still dominates 
the board diversity debate, but other forms of diversity, including age, 
cultural, nationality and race have also become part of the debate. The quest 
is to find answers to questions like whether a diversified board would be 
better, and whether diversified boards will ensure a better return for 
investors; in other words, whether there is a ‘business case’ to be made out to 
have diversity on a board. Many studies have been done, but the answer is 
still evasive. This is not totally unexpected as the criteria used for these 
studies differ and the circumstances and complexities of business are such that 
a final conclusion will probably never be reached. In this article we focus on 
the board diversity debate in Europe, Australia and South Africa – three 
completely different parts of the world. In addition we devote Part V to put the 
topic of board diversity in a broader context, but paying particular attention 
to gender diversity. 
* BProc, LLB, LLM, LLD (UOFS); Professor of Law, Deakin University. This author would like 
to thank Helen Wood, Law Librarian, Deakin University for her assistance in identifying the 
bulk of the sources that formed the basis of the first draft of this article. 
** DrJur (University of Marburg), DrJurHabil (University of Jena); Professor of Law and Chair 
Civil Law, Law of Civil Procedure and Corporate Law at the University of Muenster, Germany. 
*** FCIS, FinstD, H Dip Co Law (Wits), H Dip Tax Law (RAU), PG Dip Corp Gov (RAU); 
Group Secretary of Old Mutual, Chairman of Institute of Directors of Southern Africa and 
Member of the King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa. 
                                                 
208 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 17 NO 2 
 
I INTRODUCTION  
In this article we will focus on board diversity generally, but because of the 
importance of gender diversity, it is mentioned more often than other forms of 
board diversity. The general aim of this article is to give an overview of some of 
the arrangements in place to ensure board diversity in Europe, Australia and 
South Africa. The focus will also be on areas where progress has been made and 
the initiatives taken in Europe, Australia and South Africa to improve board 
diversity. It is, in fact, a very delicate balance to achieve if a company wants to 
get the board diversity right in order to ensure that the company performs 
optimally. Literature supports the view that having virtually no board diversity 
(ie, all directors are middle-aged men with only accounting backgrounds), or too 
much board diversity (ie, a board of six consisting of six different nationalities, 
coming from six different career backgrounds and varying in age from 18 years 
to 70 years) would be ideal.1 A good, well-motivated and considered board 
composition will achieve the best results, but achieving the right balance is 
challenging.2  
In Parts 2 to 4 of this article we focus on board diversity, including gender 
diversity, in Europe, Australia and South Africa. We have selected these 
jurisdictions because they represent some interesting and representative 
developments regarding board diversity in recent years, and perspectives from 
different parts of the world. European countries (most notably Norway) have 
taken the lead with mandatory gender quota legislation, but there are huge 
divides at the European Union (EU) level as well as among European countries 
on whether that is the best way to go. Developments in Australia are comparable 
to that in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. However, in Australia there is 
faster progress in appointing more women to the boards of listed companies 
than in most other countries where gender balance is addressed through 
voluntary codes of conduct and not mandatory gender quota legislation. South 
Africa is unique because of its statutory Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
legislation, which also indirectly promotes the appointment of black people on 
boards, thus promoting cultural diversity on boards. In Part 5 we deal with 
gender diversity and mandatory gender quotas specifically, but from a broader, 
non-country and non-jurisdiction specific point of view. 
1 See Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD), Company Directors Course Material 
(AICD, 2010) Module 8, 39, citing Nancy Adler, International Dimensions of Organisational 
Behaviour (South Western, 2002) 142–5. 
2 See AICD, above n 1, 40. 
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II EUROPE  
A European Efforts at the National Level3 
In European countries the lack of diversity on company boards is widely 
perceived to be an issue that requires serious attention. Especially, as far as 
gender imbalance is concerned, a high degree of awareness is detectable in 
almost all European nations. Although this mutual understanding exists, the 
approaches to tackle the issue differ significantly. While aiming to promote 
(gender) diversity, countries face a choice between relying on soft measures 
such as corporate governance codes, and enacting statutory regulation that is 
usually in the form of gender quotas. 
1 Norway 
Norway, which is not an EU member state, has been a front runner for 
introducing mandatory gender quotas for certain companies. In 2003 the 
Norwegian Parliament amended the Public Limited Liability Companies Act 
1997 (Norway) to ensure adequate participation of women on company boards, 
effectively prescribing that each sex represents at least 40% of board 
memberships.4 The ‘board’ affected by the quota requirements is the Styre, the 
sole board under the Norwegian one-tier system.5 The regulation, which 
gradually came into effect by the beginning of 2008, applies to publicly owned 
enterprises6 as well as to the approximately 450 public limited companies in the 
private sector in Norway.7 It is important to note that the quota requirements do 
not affect limited liability companies (there are about 200,000 of them in 
Norway). The abstinence from legislation in this field is explained by the fact 
that most of these companies are small family enterprises with the owners 
themselves being personally involved in managing the company.8 Potential 
consequences for disobeying the above-mentioned quotas are quite harsh: 
3 The authors thank Alexander Scheuch (University of Muenster) for his assistance with the 
European part of this article. 
4 For an English-language summary of the specific requirements, see Norwegian Ministry of 
Trade and Industry <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/nhd/press-centre/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-
the-legislation-on-representa.html?id=641431>. 
5 Cf Sebastian Balzter, ‘Goldröcke und Großmütter an der Macht’, FAZ (online), 15 February 
2011, 18 <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/norwegens-frauenquote-goldroecke-und-
grossmuetter-an-der-macht-1590587.html>. 
6 Public Limited Liability Companies Act 1997 (Norway) (Lov om aksjeselskaper (aksjeloven)) 
s 20-6-15. 
7 Ibid s 6-11a.  
8 Cf Norwegian Ministry of Children, ‘Equality and Social Inclusion’ (Media Release, 2010) 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bld/whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/minister/taler-og-
artikler-av-barne--likestilling/2010/Global-Roundtable-on-Board-Diversity.html?id=599588>. 
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registration of a company board will be refused by the responsible authorities in 
cases where the board’s composition does not meet the statutory requirements 
and such companies may be dissolved by court order.9 In light of these 
enforcement rules, it was not surprising that the percentage of women on 
Norwegian company boards rose significantly within a short period of time.10 In 
a study undertaken by Deloitte it was discovered that by the end of 2010, 31.9% 
of the positions on the largest ASA company boards in Norway were filled by 
women, while 35.6% of such positions were filled by women in a sample of 25 
listed companies researched by Deloitte. Thus, although not at the required 
aspiration of 40% women on boards by 1 January 2008, the percentage is 
significantly higher than in any other country Deloitte included in their study.11 
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that in 2011 the CEOs of the 20 
largest Norwegian companies were still all male.12 
2 France 
France is another country that has gained quite a bit of public attention for 
enacting legislative rules on female board representation. It is very interesting to 
retrace the development that led to this legislation. The French AFEP MEDEF 
Corporate Governance Code of Listed Corporations was only amended in April 
2010 to increase the presence of women on boards.13 Under a ‘comply or 
explain’ regime,14 the code (among other rules regarding gender balance) now 
sets forth the objective that each board shall reach a minimum percentage of 
40% women within a period of six years after the publication of the rule or the 
listing of the company’s shares.15 Although within a year of the new provision 
of the code coming into effect a rise in female participation on boards was 
already apparent,16 France nonetheless decided to enact a law concerning the 
9 Public Limited Liability Companies Act 1997, above n 6, s 16-15 (1st para, no 2). 
10 Balzter, above n 5.  
11 See The Deloitte Global Centre for Corporate Governance, Women in the Boardroom: A Global 
Perspective (November 2011) 21 
<http://www.corpgov.deloitte.com/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDe
liveryServlet/USEng/Documents/Nominating-
Corporate%20Governance%20Committee/Board%20Composition%20and%20Recruitment/Wo
men%20in%20the%20Boardroom_Deloitte_111511.pdf>. 
12 Balzter, above n 5.  
13 See English-language version, Association Française des Entreprises Privées, Corporate 
Governance Code of Listed Corporations (April 2010) 
<http://www.medef.com/fileadmin/www.medef.fr/documents/AFEP-MEDEF/Guide_AFEP-
MEDEF_An__18-11.pdf>. 
14 Ibid art 22.  
15 Ibid art 6.3 (2nd para). 
16 See Raphaële François-Poncet, Barbara Deilmann and Sabine Otte, ‘Frauenquote in 
französischen Aufsichts –– und Verwaltungsräten –– ist eine Quote auch in Deutschland 
zulässig?’ (2011) 14 NZG 450, 451. 
                                                 
2012 BOARD DIVERSITY OR GENDER DIVERSITY? 211 
 
equal representation of men and women on administrative and supervisory 
boards17 on 27 January 2011.18 The French law requires a percentage of at least 
40% of each sex on the boards of publicly listed companies and companies of a 
certain size (depending on the number of employees and annual 
revenue/profits).19 The threshold has to be reached by January 2017. Failure to 
fulfil the requirements will not have the same rigorous consequences as in 
Norway, but the impact will still be considerable. An appointment of board 
members in violation of the quota will be void.20 However, resolutions by a 
board that is not composed in accordance with the statutory provisions will still 
be effective.21 Attendance fees for board members may not be paid until a 
lawful composition of the board is reached.22 So far, judging by the numbers, 
the law has had the desired effect: the share of women on the boards of the 
largest publicly listed companies in France increased from 12.3% in October 
2010 to 22.3% in January 2012.23  
3 Other Countries with Quota Legislation 
While Norway and France might have gained the most public attention for their 
actions, there are other prominent examples of gender quota legislation in 
Europe. Belgium,24 Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, among others, have 
followed the same path in adopting comparable rules.25 
The national rules vary in details but usually require around 30% to 40% female 
board members. The companies affected by the rules vary by country but 
usually include state-owned and publicly listed companies as well as other large 
companies. Typically, a transition period of about five years is set to allow for 
the necessary adjustments. Enforcement strategies range from heavy sanctions, 
17 Under French law there is a choice between a one-tier and a two-tier board system when 
establishing a public company. 
18 Loi n° 2011-103 relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des hommes au sein des 
conseils d'administration et de surveillance et à l'égalité professionnelle. 
19 Code de Commerce [French Commercial Code] s L225-18-1 (1st para). 
20 Ibid s L225-18-1 (2nd para, 1st sentence). 
21 Ibid s L225-18-1 (2nd para, 2nd sentence). See also François-Poncet et al, above n 16, 453. 
22 See François-Poncet et al, above n 16, 453; Martin Henssler and Thomas Seidensticker, 
‘Eckdaten einer verfassungs –– und europarechtskonformen Ausgestaltung verbindlicher 
Frauenquoten für Aufsichtsräte’ (2012) 3 KSzW 10, 11. 
23 European Commission, ‘European Commission Weighs Options to Break the “Glass Ceiling” 
for Women on Company Boards’ (Press Release, IP/12/213, 5 March 2012) 5 (‘EC Press 
Release IP/12/213’). 
24 Note, ‘Frauenquote in Belgien’, FAZ, 18 June 2011 (Nr 140) 12. 
25 For a list of ‘quota nations’ in March 2012, see EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 2. See 
also The Deloitte Global Centre for Corporate Governance, above n 11, 21. 
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such as monetary fines and dissolution of the board, to mere incentives like 
preferential treatment in the awarding of contracts.26  
4 Germany 
Europe’s largest economy, Germany, is naturally at the centre of attention when 
it comes to economic legislation. Searching for rules regarding board diversity 
in the Stock Corporation Act 1965 (Germany) [Aktiengesetz (AktG)], reveals 
that there are no such rules nor any provisions on board diversity. To be in a 
position to evaluate the lack of statutory provisions governing board diversity, 
one needs to become familiar with some peculiar features of German company 
law first. Three organs are required for German public companies (AGs). They 
are the general meeting (Hauptversammlung), the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and the management board (Vorstand). This means that a two-tier 
board system is in effect, with the management board managing and directing 
the corporation, and the supervisory board being responsible for overseeing the 
management and appointing and removing members of the management board. 
For private companies (Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbHs)), 
only two organs are required: the management organ (comparable to the 
management board in the AG), and the organ for the corporators (comparable to 
the general meeting in the AG),27 but co-determination legislation also makes a 
supervisory board compulsory for some larger GmbHs.28 
There has been a long history of employee participation at supervisory board 
level, also called co-determination, in Germany. The concept of supervisory 
co-determination and the concept of the two-tier board system in Germany 
developed separately, but are now almost inextricably linked. Whether 
employee representation on a board is mandatory generally depends on the 
number of employees the company has, with some special rules applying in the 
coal and steel industry.29 For companies with more than 2,000 employees, as a 
general rule, half of the supervisory board members must be employee 
representatives whereas the other half is composed of shareholder 
representatives. The chairperson of the supervisory board is elected from the 
26 For a critical view of the sanctions (or rather the lack thereof) introduced by the Dutch law, see 
Tineke Lambooy, ‘Thirty Percent of Women on Boards; New Law in the Netherlands’ (2012) 9 
ECL 53. 
27 Friedrich Kübler and Heinz Dieter Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht (Müller Verlag, 6th ed, 2006) 
261. See also Jean J du Plessis, Bernhard Großfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger, Otto 
Sandrock and Matthias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European 
Context (Springer Verlag, 2012) 55–6. 
28 Kübler and Assmann, above n 27, ch 5; Du Plessis et al, above n 27, 155–61. 
29 For a detailed overview of the different scenarios, see Ingo Saenger, Gesellschaftsrecht (Verlag 
Franz Vahlen, 2010) 578. 
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latter group and has a casting vote.30 It is clear that co-determination provisions 
act as a ‘natural source’ of board diversity by ensuring that in many companies 
there is a significant number of employee and union representatives31 who, of 
course, often tend to have a background different from that of shareholder 
representatives.32 In addition, one of the laws governing co-determination states 
that the proportion of male/female employee representatives ‘shall’ mirror the 
respective proportion of all employees.33 It should not be omitted, however, that 
co-determination can also have a negative effect on board diversity. This holds 
true as far as nationality diversity is concerned. Unsurprisingly, employee 
representatives are primarily of German nationality. This is evidenced by a 
study which found that nationality diversity among supervisory boards is much 
lower than on management boards.34 Generally, international diversity on 
German boards is extremely low compared to other nations.35 
Besides these factors concerning board diversity that come along with the 
system of co-determination, there are also ‘soft rules’ — as opposed to 
legislative requirements — in Germany regarding the subject. They are to be 
found in the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) in the section 
dealing with the supervisory board. The code, whose content is backed by a 
‘comply or explain’ provision in the German Stock Corporations Act,36 in its 
most recent version dating from 2010, now provides as follows: 
When appointing the Management Board, the Supervisory Board shall also 
respect diversity and, in particular, aim for an appropriate consideration of 
women.37  
The Supervisory Board shall specify concrete objectives regarding its 
composition which, whilst considering the specifics of the enterprise, take into 
account … diversity. These concrete objectives shall, in particular, stipulate an 
appropriate degree of female representation. Recommendations by the 
Supervisory Board to the competent election bodies shall take these objectives 
30 See Mitbestimmungsgesetz (Germany) [Codetermination Act] 1976, ss 27, 29 (2nd para). 
31 Regarding the latter group, ibid, s 7 (2nd para). 
32 Cf Heribert Hirte,‘Geschlechterquoten in Aufsichtsrat und Vorstand’ (2011) 9 Der Konzern 
519, 522. 
33 Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz (Germany) [One-Third Participation Act] 2004, 2, 4 (4th para). 
34 See Kees van Veen and Janine Elbertsen, ‘Governance Regimes and Nationality Diversity in 
Boards: A Comparative Study of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom’ (2008) 16 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 386, 384. The authors explain this peculiarity 
of the German supervisory board very well at 389–90. 
35 European Commission, Green Paper –– The EU Corporate Governance Framework 
(COM(2011), 5 April 2011, 164 final) (‘EC Green Paper 2011’) [1.1.2]. 
36 Stock Corporations Act 1965 (Germany), s 161 (1st para, 1st sentence). 
37 GCGC art 5.1.2 (1st para, 2nd sentence). 
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into account. The concrete objectives of the Supervisory Board and the status 
of the implementation shall be published in the Corporate Governance 
Report.38  
As seen, the provisions regarding diversity apply to the composition of both 
tiers of the board. However, they can hardly be called strict taking into account 
that — different from the French Code — no set quota is given.  
An analysis of the annual reports issued by the 30 major German stock 
companies that was conducted in 2011 brought to light that 24 of those 
companies had set a target for women’s participation in the supervisory board 
— either stating absolute numbers or a certain percentage.39 The realisation of 
these goals has proceeded rather slowly, though. The most recent inspection of 
160 German listed corporations from October 2012 found women made up only 
15.32% of all supervisory board members.40 The percentage of female 
shareholder representatives is even lower, with only 10.6% being women;41 
whereas women accounted for 22.82% of employee representatives,42 which is, 
to a large extent, explained by the aforementioned provisions in German co-
determination law.43 The numbers for the management board are even more 
blatantly disproportionate. Only 4.08% of management board members are 
females.44 While looking at these numbers, one should keep in mind that 
supervisory board members serve a maximum term of five years45 which 
naturally slows down the rate of changes. 
38 Ibid art 5.4.1 (2nd and 3rd para). For further comment on this rule and for consequences of 
violation see Daniela Weber-Rey and Friederike Handt, ‘Vielfalt/Diversity im Kodex — 
Selbstverpflichtung, Bemühenspflicht und Transparenz’ (2011) 14 NZG 1; Claudia Schubert and 
Gönke Jacobsen, ‘Personelle Vielfalt als Element guter Unternehmensführung — die 
Empfehlung des Corporate Governance Kodex und die Rechtsfolgen ihrer unzureichenden 
Berücksichtigung’ (2011) 65 WM 726. 
39 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘DAX30: Nur 67 Frauen unter 500 Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern’ (Press 
Release, 29 March 2012) <http://www.pwc.de/de/pressemitteilungen/2011/dax30-nur-67-frauen-
unter-500-aufsichtsratmitgliedern.jhtml>. 
40 Fidar eV, Women-on-Board-Index (14 October 2012) 15 
<http://www.fidar.de/webmedia/documents/wob-index/121014_Studie_WoB-
Index_IX_end.pdf>. 
41 Ibid 17. 
42 Ibid 18. 
43 Henssler and Seidensticker, above n 22, 10 n 1; Marcus Schladebach and Georgia 
Stefanopoulou,‘Frauenquote in Aufsichtsräten — Überlegungen zur Änderung des Aktienrechts’ 
(2010) 65 BB 1042, 1044; Gerald Spindler and Kathrin Brandt, ‘Verfassungsrechtliche 
Zulässigkeit einer Gleichstellungsquote im Aufsichtsrat der börsennotierten AG’ (2011) 14 NZG 
401. 
44 Fidar eV, above n 40, 19. 
45 German Stock Corporations Act, above n 36, s 102 (1st para). 
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In the face of this data, there have been initiatives pushing for quota regulation 
in Germany. Proposals for legislative acts have included a quota of 40% for 
supervisory boards of listed companies and companies subject to co-
determination,46 an additional quota of 30% for management boards,47 and even 
a 50% quota for women in both tiers of the board of all stock corporations and 
some other companies.48 The most detailed proposals have been introduced to 
the Bundesrat (Federal Council, the ‘upper house’ of the German parliament) by 
the states of North Rhine-Westphalia49 and Hamburg.50 If these were to become 
law, publicly listed companies would be required eventually to reach a quota of 
40% by 2022 or 2023 (subject to a hardship clause). Under the North Rhine-
Westphalia draft, the selection of a supervisory board member violating the 
quota requirements would be void. Choosing a different approach, the Hamburg 
draft contains a kind of penalisation by refusing tax deductibility for the 
remuneration of the supervisory board members. 
All of these propositions, however, have either been rejected outright51 or not 
taken on board (yet). Currently, consensus does not even exist in the German 
government, with the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs supporting quota 
46 Alliance, 90/The Greens, Draft of a Law for the Equal Representation of Genders on 
Supervisory Boards [2010] BT-Drucksache 17/3296 (Parliamentary Documentation of the 
German Bundestag) <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/032/1703296.pdf>; Social 
Democratic Party, Motion to Enact Quota Law for Supervisory Boards and Management Boards 
[2011] BT-Drucksache 17/4683 (Parliamentary Documentation of the German Bundestag) 
<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/046/1704683.pdf>. The same approach is taken by the 
working group on female lawyers of the German lawyers’ association (DAV) — see Barbara 
Mayer, ‘Vier Thesen für die Frauenquote in Aufsichtsräten’ (2011) 61 AnwBl 919 
<http://anwaltverein.de/leistungen/Anwaltsblatt/Archiv>. 
47 Mayer, above n 46, 919. 
48 The Left, Motion Regarding the Equal Representation of Genders in Leading Positions in 
Businesses [2011] BT-Drucksache 17/4842 (Parliamentary Documentation of the German 
Bundestag) <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/048/1704842.pdf>. 
49 Draft of a Law for the Promotion of Equality of Women and Men on Supervisory Boards of 
Public Listed Companies (FöGAbUG) [2011] BR-Drucksache 87/11 (Official Document of the 
German Bundesrat) 
<http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_320/nn_2034972/SharedDocs/Drucksachen/2011/0001-0100/87-
11,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/87-11.pdf> (‘FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 
87/11’). 
50 Draft of a Law for the Promotion of Equal Participation of Women and Men in Top 
Management Positions (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förderung gleichberechtigter Teilhabe von 
Frauen und Männern in Führungsgremien, GlTeilhG) [2012] BR-Drucksache 330/12 (Official 
Document of the German Bundesrat) 
<http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_320/nn_8336/SharedDocs/Drucksachen/2012/0301-400/330-
12,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/330-12.pdf>. 
51 The above-mentioned motion by The Left party was rejected by the Bundestag Legal 
Committee in February of 2012. 
                                                 
216 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 17 NO 2 
 
legislation52 and the Minister of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and 
Youth opposing it.53 Chancellor Angela Merkel so far has sided with the latter,54 
but there have been rumours about a change of mind.55 Even if that is the case, 
she would face stiff opposition from her current coalition partner, the liberal 
Free Democrats, who have already prevented legislation that would allow for 
companies to set their own quotas.56 
B Efforts at the EU Level 
In Europe the discussion on ways to promote diversity on corporate boards has 
not been limited to the national level. EU institutions have also dealt with the 
topic and EU leaders have voiced their opinions, especially on the subject of 
women’s presence on boards. EU Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding, has 
turned out to be a particular ‘driving force’ behind the movement. She has 
repeatedly stressed the economic advantages connected to women’s 
participation in boardrooms.57 In March of 2011, Ms Reding, following a 
meeting with business leaders, announced that she would give ‘self-regulation a 
last chance’.58 She called on all publicly listed companies in Europe to sign a 
pledge to increase women’s presence on corporate boards to 30% by 2015, and 
to 40% by 2020. Barely concealed was her threat to use her ‘regulatory 
creativity’59 as ultima ratio60 if significant progress should not become visible 
within a year’s time. Commissioner Reding’s approach was welcomed by the 
European Parliament. In a resolution of 6 July 201161 the EP urged companies 
to reach said thresholds by the proposed dates, and strongly supported the 
announcement of European legislation in case voluntary measures should prove 
to be insufficient to accomplish these goals. In this case the Parliament proposed 
52 Ursula von der Leyen, as quoted in ‘Leyen will ein Drittel Frauen in Vorständen‘, FAZ, 30 
March 2011 (Nr 75) 11. 
53 Kristina Schröder, as quoted in ibid 11. 
54 Cf Kathrin Brandt and Alexander Thiele, ‘Zulässigkeit einer Gleichstellungsquote im 
Aufsichtsrat unter Berücksichtigung der Rechtsprechung des EuGH’ (2011) 56 AG 580, 581. 
55 ‘Merkel liebäugelt mit der Frauenquote’, Spiegel (online), 11 March 2012 
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,820647,00.html>. 
56 See ‘Frauenaufstand gegen Schröder’, Spiegel (online), 6 March 2012 
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,819638,00.html>. 
57 See eg, European Commission, ‘EU Justice Commissioner Reding Challenges Business 
Leaders to Increase Women’s Presence on Corporate Boards with “Women on the Board Pledge 
for Europe”’ (MEMO/11/124) 1: ‘[More women on boards] can make companies more 
profitable and trigger sustainable economic growth’. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Viviane Reding, ‘Gesetzliche Frauenquote?’ (2011) 44 ZRP 127. 
61 European Parliament Resolution of 6 July 2011 on Women and Business Leadership 
(2010/2115(INI)) (‘Resolution on Women and Business Leadership’). 
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quotas while recognising, however, the need to take into account the economic, 
structural, legal and regional specificities of the EU Member States. Company 
size was given as an example of such factors. On 5 March 2012 Commissioner 
Reding offered an evaluation of developments in the previous year. She 
expressed her disappointment about the ‘stubbornly slow’ change and the 
‘persistent lack of gender diversity in boardrooms’, revealing that only 24 
companies across Europe had signed the aforementioned pledge.62 In reaction to 
this, Ms Reding announced the launch of public consultation that ran until the 
end of May 2012 seeking views on possible (legislative) action at EU level.63 At 
the same time, the Commissioner released data indicating that there had been, at 
best, limited progress. The share of women on the boards of the largest publicly 
listed companies in the EU rose from 11.8% in October 2010 to 13.7% in 
January 2012 — the aforementioned developments in France accounting for 
around half the increase.64 It is striking that all Scandinavian EU members find 
themselves among the top group of countries when it comes to board diversity, 
while fellow Nordic nations, Iceland (25%) and Norway (42%) top the list of 
European non-EU countries.65 The Commissioner also pointed out that a survey 
conducted in all EU countries found that 75% of Europeans are in favour of 
gender balance legislation regarding company boards.66 A recent research 
report, as part of McKinsey’s ‘Women Matter’ series, found that 63% of the 235 
large European companies surveyed have at least 20 different initiatives in place 
as part of their gender diversity program, but still women accounted for more 
than a quarter of the top jobs in only 8% of companies in the survey.67 The most 
recent reports predict that before long the EU commission will present a draft 
for an EU directive that aims at a mandatory quota of 30% by 2015, and 40% by 
2020.68 
C Influence of National Constitutional Law and EU law 
The influence of EU treaties and national constitutional law on the quota debate 
is double-edged. On the one hand, both national constitutions and EU law 
demand, in one or other form, equality of men and women as a guiding 
62 EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 2. 
63 Ibid 1. 
64 Ibid 2–5. 
65 Ibid 4. See, however, Deloitte, above n 11, 21 for slightly different statistics. 
66 EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 7. 
67 McKinsey & Company, Women Matter 2012 — Making the Breakthrough (March 2012) 3 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/Organization/PDFs/Wom
en_matter_mar2012_english.ashx> . 
68 Editorial, ‘Reding Will Europaweite Frauenquote Durchdrücken’, Financial Times Deutschland 
(online), 14 June 2012 <http://www.ftd.de/karriere-management/karriere/:gleichberechtigung-
reding-will-europaweite-frauenquote-durchdruecken/70050363.html>. 
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principle69 and as a fundamental right.70 This fact is stressed by supporters of 
quota legislation71 who can also invoke, for their purposes, EU and national 
rules that allow for the adoption of measures providing for specific advantages 
in favour of the underrepresented sex, for example, to compensate for 
disadvantages in professional careers.72  
On the other hand, demanding the appointment of a certain number of board 
members from each sex can also affect the fundamental rights of candidates of 
the opposite sex, of the corporation and its shareholders. Using the example of 
the German Constitution, a quota for females could, at least in the case of a 
male candidate with superior qualifications,73 potentially violate the right to 
equality74 and the occupational freedom75 of male candidates. Some 
commentators have warned against ‘collateral damage’ of quotas in the form of 
a possible decrease in motivation of talented male candidates.76 Caution is also 
advisable with regard to the company’s perspective and its shareholders’ point 
of view: fundamental rights that could be affected are freedom of association,77 
the guarantee of property78 and, again, occupational freedom. It is also argued 
that quota laws would further jeopardise the shareholders’ freedom of choice in 
appointing board members — a freedom already limited by co-determination 
and independence requirements.79 In addition, some authors80 are of the opinion 
that national quota laws would violate European fundamental freedoms, namely, 
69 Treaty on European Union [2010] OJ C 83/13, art 3 (3rd para, 2nd sub-para); Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/49, art 8. 
70 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/01, art 23 (1st para). 
For national constitutional law see Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany] s 3 (2nd para, 1st sentence). 
71 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 16; Mayer, above n 46, 919. 
72 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, above n 70, art 23 (2nd para); Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, above n 69, art 8. See also Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, above n 70, art 3 (2nd para, 2nd sentence), which allows for steps to 
eliminate existing disadvantages. 
73 Schladebach and Stefanopoulou, above n 43, 1046; Gerd Krieger, ‘Keine Gesetzliche 
Frauenquote für Aufsichtsräte’ (2011) 61 AnwBl 918. 
74 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, above n 70, s 3 (2nd and 3rd para). 
75 Ibid, s 12 (1st para). 
76 Michael Kempter, ‘Gesetzliche Frauenquote?’ (2011) 44 ZRP 219, 220. 
77 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, above n 70, art 9 (1st para). This is mentioned 
in particular by François-Poncet et al, above n 16, 454. 
78 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, above n 70, s 14 (1st para). 
79 See the expert opinion prepared for the Association of German Jurists by Mathias Habersack, 
‘Staatliche und halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung — Gutachten E’, 
Verhandlungen des 69 (Deutschen Juristentages München 2012, Vol 1, 2012) 42. 
80 See Schladebach and Stefanopoulou, above n 43, 1045. 
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the right of establishment81 and the freedom of movement of capital,82 although 
this assessment is rejected by others.83  
This article does not intend to give an in-depth analysis of the situation from an 
EU or constitutional law perspective, which would require the specificities of 
the individual countries to be taken into account. Rather, it merely attempts to 
point out some of the potential problems and to raise awareness of the 
constitutional questions. The existence of constitutional problems has become 
obvious in France, for example, where a constitutional amendment was 
necessary in 2008 to pave the way for quota legislation. The French 
Constitution in its updated version now states as follows: 
Statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and 
posts, as well as to positions of professional and social responsibility.84  
Regarding the situation in Germany, in a detailed analysis of the constitutional 
situation, the former President of the German Federal Constitutional Court has 
come to the conclusion that a legally binding women’s quota would be 
constitutional in principle, but would be unconstitutional pertaining to 
companies in which women are generally underrepresented.85  
D Outlook and Concerns Regarding EU Legislation 
Having established the factual and legal situation in European countries and 
having described some of the underlying arguments concerning quota 
legislation, one can now venture to take a closer look at legislative quota rules 
that might be adopted in the future. 
1 Scope of Potential Rules 
No matter whether one is thinking of measures on the national or on the EU 
level, there is always the question of how broad the rules can or should be; that 
is, the scope of application needs to be defined.  
The first question deals with what kind of companies should be subjected to a 
quota regime. A case can certainly be made out for including all publicly listed 
81 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, above n 69, art 49. 
82 Ibid art 63. 
83 See Hans-Jürgen Papier and Martin Heidebach, ‘Die Einführung einer gesetzlichen Frauenquote 
für die Aufsichtsräte deutscher Unternehmen unter verfassungsrechtlichen Aspekten’ (2011) 40 
ZGR 305, 329ff. 
84 La Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 [French Constitution] s 1 (2nd para). 
85 Papier and Heidebach, above n 83, 305ff. 
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companies.86 They are typically large and due to their special position serve as a 
‘role model’ for other enterprises.87 In addition to that, shareholders of listed 
companies themselves do not usually assume the role of active involve in 
managing the company’s business88 which — as already mentioned in the 
context of Norwegian legislation — is different in most smaller private 
companies, and serves as a strong argument for the exclusion of these smaller 
private companies from quota requirements. In addition to listed corporations, 
one can also think about adding companies of a certain minimum size to the list 
of quota-regulated enterprises,89 although some authors deem the number of 
shareholders to be decisive rather than the size of the company.90 Finally, it 
could be argued that a coherent approach to quota requirements (whether 
through soft law or hard law) should, under normal circumstances, always 
include state-owned enterprises and public institutions.91  
After having determined which companies must obey the quota, in some 
countries it must further be determined which organ the quota requirement 
should apply to. This affects countries where a two-tier board system is in place. 
In the German discussion, some interesting arguments have surfaced in favour 
of limiting quotas solely to the supervisory board — not just because, in general 
terms, it seems to be a more careful and considerate approach, whereas, 
including the management board might go beyond what is necessary.92 Also, as 
noted above, the supervisory board appoints the management board members. 
By enhancing the number of female supervisory board members, the reasoning 
goes, the number of women on the management board will indirectly be 
increased, as female supervisory board members will appoint more females.93 
Furthermore, a quota rule, at least in Germany, seems to fit better into existing 
rules concerning the supervisory board than into those regarding the 
management board.94  
86 This view is sometimes criticised for the alleged lack of a connection between listing and the 
specific quotas required for listed companies — see the expert opinion prepared for the 
Association of German Jurists by Habersack, above n 79, 41. 
87 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 26; Henssler and Seidensticker, above n 22, 17. 
88 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 26; Henssler and Seidensticker, above n 22, 16. 
Also emphasising the divergence between principals and agents, see: Katja Langenbucher, 
‘Frauenquote und Gesellschaftsrecht’ (2011) 66 JZ 1038, 1040. 
89 For details, see Langenbucher, above n 88, 1041ff. 
90 Henssler and Seidensticker, above n 22, 16. 
91 Cf Krieger, above n 73, 918. 
92 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 27. This view is shared by Gregor Bachmann, 
‘Zur Umsetzung einer Frauenquote im Aufsichtsrat’ (2011) 32 ZIP 1131, 1138ff. 
93 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 2. 
94 See Langenbucher, above n 88, 1043ff. 
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Another important question concerning the scope of quota regulation relates to 
sanctions. Quite a few possible approaches come to mind. In a survey, European 
citizens expressed their preference for monetary fines in case companies fall 
short of the quota (49% of all participants mentioned this as an effective 
sanction).95 Other commonly mentioned possibilities include the refusal of 
public grants (30% in favour), the annulment of the nomination of members of 
the overrepresented gender (28%), the annulment of board decisions (28%) and 
the deregistration of the company (10%).96 An extreme sanction, such as the 
deregistration of the company, may lead to quicker results (see Norway) but 
raises strong doubts about its consistency with the principle of proportionality97 
and has even been called a ‘grotesque’ consequence.98 This is also true of the 
threat of delisting the company.99 Sometimes the same is said of the annulment 
of board decisions,100 although this case is not as clear-cut. One has to concede, 
however, that this might make necessary an action for nullification which 
clashes with the principle of legal certainty and could, at the same time, give 
rise to vexatious litigants.101 Hence, nullification of board decisions does not 
seem like an ideal solution. Even the Constitutional Court of Belgium expressed 
constitutional concerns about the first version of a quota law that included the 
sanction of nullification of board decisions.102 Monetary fines, on the other 
hand, are also accompanied by a serious problem since they might be viewed as 
an incentive for the company to buy its way out of having to respect the 
quota.103  
Other questions regarding the scope of possible rules concern the exact 
percentage (eg, 30% or 40%) and the existence and scope of exceptions to the 
rule, for example, hardship clauses. They shall not be discussed here but are 
sufficiently explored elsewhere.104  
2 Questions Regarding EU Competence 
Even if one could find satisfactory answers to all the questions presented about 
the scope of a quota law, one would still have to decide whether quota 
95 EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 7. 
96 Ibid. 
97 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 21. 
98 Krieger, above n 73, 918. 
99 Spindler and Brandt, above n 43, 404; Bachmann, above n 92, 1138. 
100 Krieger, above n 73, 918. 
101 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 20–1. Cf Bachmann, above n 92, 1138; Hirte, 
above n 32, 528 is critical of this approach. 
102 Cf ‘Frauenquote in Belgien’, above n 14, 12. 
103 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 21. 
104 See, eg, Bachmann, above n 92, 1137; Henssler and Seidensticker, above n 22, 13ff. 
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regulation should only happen at the national level or be imposed by the EU. 
The EU Commission and the EU Parliament apparently act on the assumption 
that EU competence on the subject exists. This is supported by the argument 
that divergent national quota laws can be obstacles for businesses in the EU 
internal market.105 Concerns have been expressed at the national level, though. 
Criticism focuses on the principle of subsidiarity106 that might be violated by 
EU legislation.107 This fear, among others, has even been expressed by the 
German Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth.108 It is 
questionable whether a sufficient basis for EU competence exists. This has 
seldom been discussed in the professional literature. However, a very thorough 
examination by a German professor has recently answered the question in the 
negative.109 Another objection to the EU’s line of action has targeted 
Commissioner Reding’s heavy reliance on the finding that three-quarters of 
Europeans are in support of quota legislation. This, it is argued, effectively 
comes very close to law-making by referendum which would not be allowed 
under EU rules.110 In conclusion, one can predict that EU efforts to adopt quota 
laws would be exposed to fierce criticism from some member states. 
E Summary and Analysis 
At both a national and EU level, there have been serious attempts to address 
board diversity, in particular, the issue of underrepresentation of women on the 
boards of public companies. The European countries Belgium, Norway, France, 
the Netherlands and Spain have taken the lead in introducing legislation to 
mandate up to 40% women on the boards of public companies. Understandably, 
especially because there are severe sanctions such as the possibility of 
deregistration linked to not achieving the quotas, considerable increases in the 
number of females on boards of public companies have been achieved in those 
countries. There are, however, several other countries where it is argued that the 
same could be achieved, over time, through voluntary codes of conduct. It is 
therefore clear that there is currently a deep divide as to what method should be 
used to achieve board diversity generally, and gender diversity in particular. 
However, there is little doubt that it is generally accepted that the issue of 
general imbalance in favour of men should be addressed. Opinions also vary as 
105 EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 2. 
106 Treaty on European Union, above n 69, art 5 (3rd para). 
107 François-Poncet et al, above n 16, 454; Bachmann, above n 92, 1135. 
108 As quoted in ‘Deutschland wehrt sich gegen EU-weite Frauenquote’, Welt (Online), 5 March 
2012 <http://www.welt.de/dieweltbewegen/article13904721/Deutschland-wehrt-sich-gegen-EU-
weite-Frauenquote.html, 5 March 2012>. 
109 Jens Koch, ‘EU-Kompetenz für eine Frauenquote in den Führungsgremien von 
Aktiengesellschaften’ (2011) 175 ZHR 827. 
110 Quoted in Welt (online), above n 108. 
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to what the ideal balance is or what the quota should be. Our research reveals 
that it is highly likely that the topic of board diversity and gender diversity in 
particular will remain a ‘hot topic’ in Europe, both at national and EU levels. 
There are some very interesting challenges ahead for the EU. There are possible 
constitutional objections that could be raised against mandatory gender quota 
legislation but there are at the same time constitutional protections that could be 
used to justify mandatory gender quota legislation. For instance, both national 
constitutions and EU law demand, in one or other form, equality of men and 
women as a guiding principle and as a fundamental right. This fact is stressed 
by supporters of quota legislation who can also invoke, for their purposes, EU 
and national rules that allow for the adoption of measures providing for specific 
advantages in favour of the underrepresented sex, to compensate, eg, for 
disadvantages in professional careers. In principle, this will also apply to 
underrepresentation of women on boards.  
III AUSTRALIA 
A Overview 
The fact that in most Australian company boards there is a gender imbalance in 
favour of men has never been disputed. All data available show the gender 
imbalance (in favour of men) very clearly, and that the gender balance is still 
not right is obvious — see data below. However, especially since 2010, there 
have been serious efforts to make sure that more women are appointed to 
Australian boards, especially for listed public companies. The gender imbalance 
on boards is currently being addressed by the Australian Securities Exchange’s 
(ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations,111 which is the 
voluntary code of corporate governance applying to all listed companies through 
the ASX’s Listing Rules. It is not difficult to predict that if the right gender 
balance is not going to be achieved through this voluntary code of corporate 
governance, as in some other countries (see discussion below), mandatory 
quotas of women on Australian boards will be dictated by legislation. 
111 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations with 2010 Amendments (2nd ed, 2010) 
<http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/cg_principles_recommendations_with_2010_amend
ments.pdf >. 
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B ASX Corporate Governance Council: 2010 
Amendments to the 2007 Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations 
1  Overview  
In 2010 several amendments were made to the ASX’s Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations. These amendments were also informed by 
the 2009 Report on Diversity on Boards prepared by the Australian 
Government’s Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC).112 
Several of these changes deal with board diversity. Recommendation 3.2 
currently reads as follows: 
Companies should establish a policy concerning diversity and disclose the 
policy or a summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements 
for the board to establish measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity 
for the board to assess annually both the objectives and progress in achieving 
them. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council suggested that a diversity policy 
should be established in the financial year commencing 1 July 2010. As far as 
the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations are 
concerned, it was made clear that diversity includes, but is not limited to, 
gender, age, ethnicity and cultural background. The measurable objectives 
should identify ways in which the achievement of gender diversity is measured, 
for example, the proportion of women employed by (or who are consultants to) 
the company in senior executive positions and on the board. Where companies 
establish a diversity policy, they should also introduce appropriate procedures to 
ensure that the policy is implemented properly, which may include additional 
measurable objectives in relation to other aspects of diversity as identified in the 
policy. There should also be an internal review mechanism to assess the 
effectiveness of the policy.  
Box 3.2 of the ASX Principles and Recommendations contains some 
suggestions for the content of a diversity policy. It is clear that the suggestions 
are not only aimed at gender diversity at board level, but diversity generally at 
all levels. It is suggested that companies should articulate their commitment to 
diversity, the corporate benefits arising from employee and board diversity, and 
the importance of benefiting from all available talent. It is suggested this would 
promote an environment conducive to the appointment of well-qualified 
112 CAMAC, Diversity on Boards (March 2009) Australian Government 
<http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFFinal+Reports+2009/$file/Board_
Diversity_B5.pdf>.  
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employees, senior management and board candidates so that there is appropriate 
diversity to maximise the achievement of corporate goals. 
The fact that the focus is not on gender diversity only, is also confirmed by the 
suggestion in the ASX Principles and Recommendations that there should be a 
commitment to, and identification of, ways to promote a corporate culture 
which embraces diversity when determining the composition of employees, 
senior management and the board, including recruitment of employees and 
directors from a diverse pool of qualified candidates. Skills development, such 
as executive mentoring programs or more targeted practices relating to career 
advancement such as those that develop skills and experience that prepare 
employees for senior management and board positions, will also enhance the 
skills diversity of ordinary employees, managers, senior executives and board 
members.113 
2  Gender Diversity  
Recommendation 3.4 deals specifically with gender diversity: 
Companies should disclose in each annual report the proportion of women 
employees in the whole organisation, women in senior executive positions and 
women on the board. 
It is explained that diversity is an economic driver of competitiveness for 
companies. It is also pointed out that research has shown that increased gender 
diversity on boards is associated with better financial performance, and that 
improved workforce participation at all levels positively influences the 
economy. 114 Kang, Cheng and Gray point out that there has been mixed 
evidence and constant debate regarding the effect of board composition on 
corporate performance.115 However, they find that board diversity is still 
considered to be desirable, because it results in more balanced board 
discussions.116  
The ASX Principles and Recommendations suggest that the promotion of 
gender diversity broadens the pool for recruitment of high-quality employees, 
enhances employee retention, encourages greater innovation, and improves 
corporate image and reputation. Reporting on the diversity profile of the 
113 ASX Corporate Governance Council, above n 111, Box 3.2. 
114 Ibid, Commentary on Recommendation 3.4, 25. 
115 Helen Kang, Mandy Cheng and Sidney J Gray, ‘Corporate Governance and Board 
Composition: Diversity and Independence of Australian Boards’ (2007) 15 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 194, 194. 
116 Ibid 194–5. 
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company facilitates greater transparency and accountability in relation to the 
policy that has been put in place, together with the objectives to be achieved by 
the company. Companies should consider, in the context of the economic group 
controlled by the company, how best to report to achieve an accurate and non- 
misleading impression of the relative participation of women and men in the 
workplace and the roles in which they are employed. For instance, this might be 
whether a full-time equivalent measure is appropriate in all or some 
circumstances as opposed to clear categorisation of full-time, part-time and 
contracted services, and whether the participation is in a leadership, 
management, professional specialty or supporting role, or by relative 
participation of men and women at different remuneration bands. The board, or 
an appropriate board committee, such as the nomination or remuneration 
committee, should be charged with the duty, at least annually, to review and 
report on the relative proportion of women and men in the workforce at all 
levels of the economic group controlled by the company. This obligation should 
be included in the charter of the board or the relevant board committee. 117 
Recommendation 3.5 covers reporting on diversity ‘comply or explain’ 
provisions — the reporting should be included in the corporate governance 
statement in the annual report. It is then provided that the following material 
should be made publicly available, ideally by posting it to the company’s 
website in a clearly marked corporate governance section: 
• any applicable code of conduct or a summary; and 
• the diversity policy or a summary of its main provisions. 
In recent time several initiatives have been undertaken in Australia to increase 
the skills base of women and to ensure that more women are appointed to 
boards. The changes to the ASX’s Principles and Recommendations above 
clearly have this aim in mind. In April 2010 the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner of the Australian Human Rights Commission, Elizabeth 
Broderick,118 brought together a group of influential business leaders, which led 
to the formation of a ‘Male Champions of Change Group’. This group actively 
promotes the appointment of more women in leadership positions and also 
advises the Commissioner on gender issues.119 In 2010 the Business Council of 
Australia (BCA) established a one-year pilot mentoring program for high-
achieving women within the BCA member companies, called the ‘C Suite’ 
117 ASX Corporate Governance Council, above n 111, Commentary on Recommendation 3.4, 25. 
118 See Human Rights Commission, Elizabeth Broderick 
<http://humanrights.gov.au/about/president_commissioners/broderick.html>. 
119 See Human Rights Commission, Male Champions of Change 
<http://humanrights.gov.au/sex_discrimination/male-champions/index.html>. 
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Project. The project involved BCA members in personally mentoring women 
employed by other BCA member companies. This kind of one-on-one 
mentoring by people at the top aims to open up pathways for talented women to 
rise up the corporate ladder.120 A similar initiative called the Mentoring 
Program was undertaken by the AICD. It was first launched in April 2010. The 
Program involves leading chairmen and directors working with highly talented 
and qualified women in a 12-month mentoring relationship. It is a practical and 
concrete measure designed to help achieve a greater representation of women on 
boards.121 Other initiatives of the AICD include the Board Ready Program, 
Board Diversity Scholarship Program and several places reserved for women on 
the AICD’s Company Directors Course, which they may attend without paying 
the course fee of $AU5,400 for those who are members of the AICD.122 
Real-time statistics collated by the AICD in October 2010 show that:123 
• women then represented 10.1% of directors of ASX200 boards, up from 
8.3% at the beginning of 2010 and higher than the 8.4% figure stated in 
the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency (EOWA) 
Census; 
• a total of 40 women directors have been appointed up to October 2010, 
compared to only 10 for the whole of 2009; 
• 27% of directors appointed up to October 2010 have been female, 
compared to only 5% in 2009 and 8% in 2007 and 2008; 
• there were then six female chairs (one more than noted by EOWA) and 
seven female CEOs (one more than noted by EOWA); 
• 37 companies then had two or more women on their boards (11 more 
than noted by EOWA); 
• the proportion of companies with no women on their boards has fallen 
from 54% as recorded in the 2010 EOWA Census to 46.5%; and 
120 See BCA, A Role for Business — Women in the Leadership Suite (2012) 
<http://www.bca.com.au/Content/101727.aspx>. 
121 See AICD, Chairman’s Mentoring Program (2011) 
<http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Governance-and-Director-
Issues/Board-Diversity/Mentoring-Programs>. 
122 See AICD, Board Diversity (2011) <http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-
Centre/Governance-and-Director-Issues/Board-Diversity>. 
123 AICD, ‘More Action Needed but Progress being Made on Women Directors’ (Media Release, 
6 October 2010) <http://www.companydirectors.com.au/General/Header/Media/Media-
Releases/2010/More-action-needed-but-progress-being-made-on-women-directors>. 
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• a total of 93 boards still did not have any women directors (15 less than 
noted by EOWA) by October 2010. 
Up to May 2011, 79 boards in the ASX200 companies still had no women, but 
this was a significant improvement as, in the beginning of 2010, there were 115 
ASX200 companies without any women on their boards.124 In August 2011 the 
following statistics were provided by the AICD:125 
• women made up 17.6% of directors of ASX50 companies, 16.1% of 
ASX100 companies and 12.7% of ASX200 companies (it was said, at 
that stage, by the AICD chairman, John Colvin, that ‘Australia now 
ranks ahead of many of our international peers in gender composition of 
top listed company boards, including the United Kingdom, Canada and 
New Zealand’; and 
• up to August 2011, women comprised an average of 29% of all new 
appointments to ASX200 companies, compared to only 5% in 2009 and 
8% in 2007 and 2008. 
On 23 August 2012 the AICD provided the following statistics:126 
• women made up 14.5% of board members for ASX200 companies; 
• it was reported that 56 ASX200 boards still do not have any women; 
and 
• in line with 2011 figures, up to August 2012, 28% of all 2012 board 
appointments for ASX200 companies were women. 
The AICD points out that in August 2012 the number of women on the boards 
of ASX200 companies is the highest ever, but admits that there is still a long 
way to go127 as is also illustrated by Forbes’ 2012 Index, placing Australia in the 
21st position out of 50 as far as the percentage of women on boards in Australia 
124 AICD, ‘Directors Continue to Lead in the Push to Increase Women on Boards’ (Media 
Release, 2 May 2011). For 2006 data, see Kang et al, above n 115, 199–200.  
125 AICD, ‘Diversity Drives Corporate Performance’ (Media Release, 9 August 2011) 
<http://www.companydirectors.com.au/General/Header/Media/Media-Releases/2011/Diversity-
drives-corporate-performance>. For slightly more updated statistics, see Deloitte, above n 11, 6. 
In November 2011, it was 12.5%. 
126 See AICD, <http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Governance-
and-Director-Issues/Board-Diversity/Statistics>. See also ‘Governance of Listed Companies’ 
(2012) 28 (October) Company Director 60, 61. 
127 See AICD, above n 126. 
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is concerned.128 This is the case irrespective of the fact that Australia ranks 
reasonably well as far as employee diversity generally is concerned and is in 
fact ranked fourth out of 50 nations.129 It is easy to predict that more women 
will be appointed on Australian boards in the future. Gender diversity is 
nowadays driven by the reporting requirements on the number of women 
employees and directors and there is also investor as well as community 
pressure that more women should be appointed on Australian boards. In 
addition, there are serious attempts from the the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner Elizabeth Broderick to ensure that appropriate female targets for 
board appointments are achieved. Specific legislation in Australia, like the 
Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth),130 requires reporting on the number 
of males and females employed and will ensure equality in this regard over 
time. Ensuring equality at lower levels of appointment will eventually lead to 
more women being appointed in middle, senior and executive positions, which 
will naturally also have a flow-on effect to the appointment of more women on 
boards. The Australian Human Rights Commission’s 2010 Gender Equality 
Blueprint has made a recommendation that a target of 40% females on all listed 
companies should be promoted by 2015131 and Ms Broderick is actively 
promoting the achievement of this target. It will be clear that this target is based 
on the Norwegian example (as targets only at this stage), but it is also not 
difficult to predict that if targets are not set and/or targets are not achieved by 
companies, quota legislation may well be the next step also in Australia to 
ensure that a significant number of females are appointed to at least the boards 
of Australian listed companies.132 
It is easy to predict that more women will be appointed on Australian boards in 
the future. On the one hand, this is driven by the reporting requirements on the 
number of women employees and directors; on the other hand, there is investor 
pressure that more women should be appointed to boards. 
128 Forbes Insights 2012, Diversity & Inclusion: Unlocking Global Potential: Global Diversity 
Rankings by Country, Sector and Occupation 10 
<http://images.forbes.com/forbesinsights/StudyPDFs/global_diversity_rankings_2012.pdf>. 
129 Ibid 3, 14. 
130 See <http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/eowa_fact_sheet.pdf>. 
131 Australian Human Rights Commission, 2010 Gender Equality Blueprint 16 
<http://www.humanrights.gov.au/sex_discrimination/publication/blueprint/Gender_Equality_Bl
ueprint.pdf>. 
132 See generally Douglas M Branson, ‘An Australian Perspective on a Global Phenomenon: 
Initiatives to Place Women on Corporate Boards of Directors’ (2012) 27 AJCL 2; Peta Spender, 
‘Gender Diversity on Board of Australia’ (2012) 27 AJCL 22, 23, 25–8, 35–7; Susan Watson, 
‘Gender Diversity on Boards in New Zealand — Followers Not Leaders’ (2012) 27 AJCL 39. 
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C Summary and Analysis 
The debate on board diversity in Australia is dominated by gender diversity. 
However, it is clear that gender diversity is seen in the broader context of board 
diversity generally, including age, ethical and cultural diversity. In 2010 the 
ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations were amended 
to ensure that listed companies develop a diversity policy and that a summary of 
that policy should be disclosed. There should also be procedures in place to 
ensure compliance with the diversity policy. Box 3.2 of the Principles and 
Recommendations contains some specific suggestions on what issues should be 
dealt with in a diversity policy. As far as gender diversity is concerned, listed 
companies should disclose in each annual report the proportion of women 
employees in the whole organisation, women in senior executive positions and 
women on the board. This is an ‘if not, why not?’ provision, meaning that 
companies will have to explain if they do not disclose the information. Several 
initiatives by the BCA and the AICD are aimed at not only giving women 
exposure to senior executive function and board functions, but also providing 
women the opportunity to attend directors training courses. 
The statistics show that there are still not many women serving on the boards of 
ASX200 companies. However, there are strong indications that this is changing 
rapidly.  
IV SOUTH AFRICA133 
A Overview 
A 2011 census, relying on data up to 30 September 2010, revealed that 15.8% of 
all South African directorships in listed public companies were held by women. 
The census report points out that, at that stage, the percentage of women on 
boards of listed South African companies was better than South Africa’s 
international counterparts.134 In fact, other comparative data clearly shows that 
in comparison with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, China and Singapore, South Africa was in the lead as far as the 
percentage of female board positions and female executive manager positions 
133 The authors thank Ansie Ramalho (BIuris, LLB), Chief Executive of the Institute of Directors 
in Southern Africa (IoDSA), for her assistance with the South African part of this article. 
134 See, eg, Businesswomen’s Association of South Africa, BWA South African Women in 
Leadership Census 2011 (2011) 10 
<http://www.bwasa.co.za/Census/2011CensusResults/tabid/14840/Default.aspx>.  
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for listed companies was concerned. Women held 16.6% of directorships and 
19.3% of executive manager positions in listed South African companies.135  
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) undertook a study in transformation of 
board positions held on 269 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange at March 2011, and provided the following data:136 
 Women Black 
Directors 14% 25.3% 
Executive Directors 7.4% 9.5% 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
 
 
12.9% 27.6% 
Independent Non-
Executive Directors 
 
21.2% 
 
38.1% 
 
  
BUSA points out that the Black Economic Empowerment Code 2007 (South 
Africa) (BEE Code) sets out to achieve 50% black directors by 2017.137 
The Businesswomen’s Association of South Africa has undertaken a Women in 
Leadership Census since 2004.138 These reflect women in directorships, as 
follows, over the period: 
• 2004: 7.1% 
• 2005: 10.7% 
• 2006: 11.5% 
• 2007: 13.1% 
• 2008: 14.3%139 
• 2009: 14.6% 
• 2010: 16.6% 
• 2011: 15.8% 
135 Jennifer Whelan and Robert Wood, ‘Targets and Quotas for Women in Leadership: A Global 
Review of Policy, Practice, and Psychological Research’ (Gender Equality Project, Centre for 
Ethical Leadership, Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, May 2012) 16. 
136 See BUSA, Business Unity South Africa (Busa) Transformation Study: A Snapshot of the 
Demographic Profile and Pace of Transformation of JSE Listed Companies 
<http://www.busa.org.za/docs/SUMMARY%20A%20Snapshot%20of%20the%20Demographic
%20Profile%20and%20Pace%20of%20Transformation%20of%20JSE%20listed%20companies.
pdf>. 
137 See also <www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee_codes.jsp>. 
138 See Businesswomen’s Association of South Africa, above n 134, 10. 
139 In 2008 39.6% of Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies had no women and only 
7.8% of all CEOs for listed companies were women — see Sharon Davis, ‘Steady Progress 
towards Gender Equality in Corporate World’ (2008) October-December WITS Business School 
Journal 23. 
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The above statistics must be seen against the backdrop of a total population of 
50.59 million, of which approximately 52% is female, according to estimated 
statistics for mid-2011.140 The annual report of the Commission of Employment 
Equity covering the period 2010–2011 shows that females constitute 44.8% of 
the total economically active population in South Africa.141  
According to a paper by Mathur-Helm, reaching top-level positions is still 
uncommon for South Africa’s women, as its corporate environment is not yet 
ready to accept women as professional equals. She found that government 
legislation and policies work against women’s growth and advancement rather 
than in their favour, because they are dependent on management strategies that 
treat women differently in terms of social constructs, attitudes and norms and 
stereotypes created by corporate culture in South Africa.142 
In comparison it is, however, positive to note the steady increase of females and 
black persons in membership of the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa 
(IoDSA) over the past five years. Whilst not all members are directors of 
companies, such members do meet the strict membership criteria of IoDSA and 
hold significantly senior positions in business, para-statals or a profession. 
The steady increase in membership of women and black persons in the IoDSA 
is clearly illustrated by the following table: 
 Women Black 
2007 19% 35% 
2008 21% 37% 
2009 23% 40% 
2010 24% 42% 
2011 26% 45% 
 
It is worth mentioning that in 2011 the IoDSA had approximately 5,000 
members. The IoDSA has successfully, together with various of its key 
stakeholders, focused on marketing and other appropriate initiatives to try to 
ensure the required growth is achieved, and is still striving to get more women 
and black persons as members. This will, over time, ensure that the pool of 
140 See Statistics South Africa, Mid-Year Population Statistics 2011 (2011) 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022011.pdf>. 
141 See Department of Labour, Republic of South Africa, 11th CEE Annual Report 2010-2011 
<http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=148340>. 
142 Babita Mathur-Helm, ‘Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action for South African Women: 
A Benefit or Barrier?’ (2005) 20 Women in Management Review 56. 
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qualified women and black persons to fill board positions will be even bigger 
which will assist in achieving and ensuring a better diversity on the boards of 
South African companies as far as gender and race are concerned. 
B Corporate Governance Influence 
It should be noted that board composition and diversity in South Africa need to 
be viewed in the context of a unitary board structure, with minimal stakeholder 
participation other than appointment of representative directors by major 
shareholders in certain instances.143 Also, the business environment in South 
Africa operates within the context of a post-apartheid regime. In the Bill of 
Rights contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 
(South Africa) it is provided that discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, 
race and gender is unlawful, which assists, to a certain extent, to achieve 
diversity on boards. 
Whilst South Africa’s population is extremely diverse, board diversity in 
particular has been driven, encouraged, and supported in the post-apartheid era, 
not only by business and individuals, but also by various codes, charters, quotas 
and legislation.144 A particularly interesting aspect in South Africa is that 
companies may choose to be measured using the Generic Scorecard or their 
individual sector scorecards. The Generic Scorecard requires companies to 
report on seven Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) pillars, 
each of which contributes to the outcome of the scorecard. The B-BBEE 
Generic Scorecard emphasises all aspects of business and society. Each pillar is 
worth between five and 20 points on the scorecard. Companies with annual 
turnover above R35 million per annum must comply with all seven pillars of the 
Generic Scorecard. One of the main objectives for the government in bringing 
out a generic scorecard was to promote economic transformation in order to 
enable meaningful participation of black people in the South African 
economy.145 Various sector scorecards have already been developed, including 
construction, tourism, forestry, transport, finance, ICT, mining, and 
143 See s 66(1) of the Companies Act 2008 (South Africa) for the powers and functions of the 
board and the appointment and election of directors. 
144 See Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003 (South Africa) (Codes of Good 
Practice on Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa, South African Government Gazette, 
No 29617, 9 February 2007).  
145 See Permier Verification — B-BBEE Verification Services, The Generic Scorecard (26 May 
2010) <http://www.premierbee.co.za/downloads/Generic_scorecard.pdf>. 
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petroleum.146 It is clear that these scorecards focus the attention on BEE and 
also directly on board diversity. 
In 1993 the King Committee was formed, named after its Chair, former 
Supreme Court judge, Mervyn King.147 The Reports by this committee became 
known as King I (1994),148 King II (2002)149 and King III (2010).150 In King I 
and II there was no specific focus on board diversity in the context of gender 
and race, but board diversity as far as a balance of executive and non-executive 
directors is concerned was a prominent focus in both reports.151 The impact of 
the King Reports was considerable with some unique and innovative approaches 
to corporate governance, which have since been adopted and have influenced 
strategic thinking on corporate governance in many parts of the world.152 The 
landscape shifted somewhat with the advent of King III, which acknowledged 
that social transformation and redress from apartheid was important, and should 
be integrated within the broader transition to sustainability in a strategic and 
coherent manner, to give rise to greater opportunities, efficiencies and benefits 
for both companies and society.153 The benefit of involving women, particularly 
in sustainability issues, is an added dimension in terms of increased diversity of 
thinking and bringing a powerful consumerism aspect to the fore.154 
King III continued to suggest that strategies and policies designed to achieve 
responsible corporate citizenship should be planned and co-ordinated across all 
sections of a company to avoid fragmentation.155 By way of an example, a 
scenario where a company seeks to respond to the requirements of an industry-
specific BEE Charter,156 as well as the government’s B-BBEE Scorecard,157 but 
146 See for the Construction Sector Scorecard, Basil Read, Sustainable Development (2009) 
<http://financialresults.co.za/2010/basilread_ar2009/sd_scorecard.htm>. For the Tourism Sector 
Scorecard, see Avis, Rent A Car Report <www.avis.co.za/AboutAvis/AvisBBBEE.aspx>. 
147 See generally Mervyn E King SC (2012) <http://www.mervynking.co.za/>. 
148 The King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 
1994). 
149 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa — 2002 (King II) (Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, 2002). 
150 King Report on Governance for South Africa — 2009 (King III) (Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa 2009) <http://african.ipapercms.dk/IOD/KINGIII/kingiiireport/>. 
151 King I, above n 148, 12 [16]–[17]; ‘Recommendations’ in King II, above n 149, 60; see also 
57–8 [7]–[10]. 
152 Jean J du Plessis, J Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 8, 11–12, 51–2, 96. 
153 See King III, above n 150, 14. 
154 See our discussion below: ‘3 Reasons for having more women on boards’. 
155 King III, above n 150, 24 [29]. 
156 See, eg, Old Mutual, Black Economic Empowerment Charter (2012) 
<http://www.oldmutual.co.za/about-us/transformation/black-empowerment/old-mutual%27s-
bee-charter.aspx>. 
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fails to integrate these efforts effectively into a broader sustainability framework 
results in fragmentation and needs to be avoided. A ‘tick box’ approach to 
governance and compliance is therefore discouraged by King III, and a short-
sighted approach to governance is viewed as contributing to inefficiencies 
which result in investments with poor social returns, as well as corporate 
failures.158  
King III went on to assert that the connection between sustainability and BEE is 
not always fully understood, and that consequently there is a significant 
opportunity to clarify and institutionalise it to leverage on investors’ growing 
recognition of sustainability when considering an investment. It was also felt 
that using this opportunity would engender greater confidence in considering 
South Africa as an investment destination.159  
King III also supports the positive interaction between the diversity of views 
that occurs between individuals of different skills, experience and backgrounds, 
and considers a unitary board structure, with executive directors and non-
executive directors interacting in working groups, as appropriate for South 
African companies. King III specifically recommends that every board should 
consider whether its size, diversity and demographics make it effective, with 
diversity being considered in relation to academic qualifications, technical 
expertise, relevant industry knowledge, experience, nationality, age, race and 
gender.160  
The importance of board diversity is highlighted in King III by focusing on the 
positive interaction and diversity of views that occur in boards made up of 
individuals with different skills, experience and background.161 The important 
role of independent non-executive directors in a unitary board structure is also 
emphasised as they bring objective judgment on all issues facing the company, 
including strategy, performance, sustainability, resources, transformation, 
diversity, employment equity, standards of conduct and evaluation of 
performance.162 The recruitment of such non-executive directors from a broader 
and more diverse pool would serve to enhance the breadth and depth of input on 
the required deliberations, considerations and decisions to be taken.  
157 See Basil Read, above n 146; Avis, above n 146.  
158 King III, above n 150, 24 [31]. 
159 Ibid 24 [32]. 
160 Ibid 38 [62], 39 [71]. 
161 Ibid 38 [62]. 
162 Ibid ch 2 [71]. 
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In October 2010, the King Committee issued a Practice Note on B-BBEE,163 
which highlighted that the empowerment of previously disadvantaged 
individuals, in particular black women, workers and people with disabilities 
(collectively referred to as ‘black people’), should be based on the premise of 
equal partnership in the corporate sphere, with their contributions being equally 
valuable. The Practice Note further recommends that in addition to a company 
disclosing its B-BBEE rating in its annual report, disclosure of ‘the significance 
of the roles played by black people on the Board, Remuneration Committee, 
Nominations Committee and other important Committees’ is useful to 
stakeholders.  
To this end it is concluded in the Practice Note that all businesses in South 
Africa acknowledge that successfully implementing B-BBEE is not only 
ethically right, but also commercially prudent, and a necessary measure for the 
normalisation of South African society, and specifically the socio-economic 
uplifting of black people. It is important to consider this aspect and balance it 
against a possible investor’s view either in South Africa or from an external 
investor’s point of view. South Africa is still a very good investment option for 
foreign investors.164 The attractiveness of South Africa for investors will, over 
the long run, depend on the operating efficiencies of companies and a healthy 
diversity on boards where a merit-based approach for board appointments forms 
part of the corporate culture of companies.165 It is evident that huge importance 
is placed on ensuring the correct level of diversity in terms of the demographics 
on a board, in the socio, political and economic context of the community, and 
the environment in which the company operates in South Africa. 
In all three King Reports a legislative and principle-based approach to corporate 
governance was duly considered. King III was explicit in adopting an approach 
to align the voluntary code of good corporate governance with new company 
law legislation.166 In King III an ‘apply or explain’ approach was adopted which 
was considered to allow sufficient flexibility to cater for the specific needs of a 
business entity, and ensure adequate focus by the board and management on 
these matters.167 
163 See Iodsa, King III Practice Notes 
<http://www.iodsa.co.za/PRODUCTSSERVICES/KingIIIReportPapersGuidelines/KingReporto
nCorporateGovernanceinSA/KingIIIPracticeNotes.aspx>.  
164 See Mariam Isa, ‘SA Tops Subregion in Foreign Direct Investment’, BusinessDay (online), 6 
July 2012 <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=175726>. 
165 On the ‘merit principle’ as a reason not to have targets or quotas for women, see Whelan and 
Wood, above n 135, 9. 
166 King III, above n 150, 5. 
167 Ibid 6. 
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C Legislative Influence 
The South African government introduced various policy, legislative and 
regulatory interventions to specifically address the inequities of the past. The 
Employment Equity Act 1998 (South Africa) had as its main objective the 
promotion of equal opportunities and fair treatment in employment practices. Its 
purpose is also to proactively redress past disadvantages by providing a 
framework for affirmative action. The envisaged outcome is that there will be 
equitable representation of previously disadvantaged individuals in all 
occupation categories and levels in the workforce.168 
The Skills Development Act 1998 (South Africa) was introduced to improve the 
employment prospects of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination, and to redress those disadvantages through training and 
education. 
The National Policy Framework for Women’s Empowerment and Gender 
Equality 1996 was issued by the Office on the Status of Women in the 
Presidency which has jurisdiction over the national gender. This Framework 
outlines South Africa’s vision for gender equality and how it intends to reach 
that ideal. There is reference in the document to various white papers issue by 
government, including the White Paper on Transforming Public Service 
Delivery (1997) and the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service 
(1998).169 
The Commission for Gender Equality is an entity created by the South African 
Constitution to address transformation in gender relations. Its mission is to 
advance, promote and protect gender equality in South Africa through 
undertaking research, public education, policy development, legislative 
initiatives, effective monitoring and litigation.170 
The new Companies Act 2008 (South Africa) (the Act) is not prescriptive 
regarding diversity on boards, the rationale being that, generally, legislation 
should not impose but rather should facilitate this important consideration. The 
prescribed statutory requirements for directors to act in the best interests of the 
company as a whole and to recognise stakeholders’ interests in an inclusive and 
integrated manner, serve to promote the skills and diversity attributes required 
of a board. 
168 See Department of Labour, Republic of South Africa, Employment Equity Act (4 July 2012) 
<http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/acts/employment-equity/employment-equity-act>. 
169 See The Office on the Status of Women, South Africa’s National Policy Framework for 
Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality, South African Government 
<http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2000/gender.pdf>. 
170 See Commission for Gender Equality, ‘Welcome’ (2012) <http://www.cge.org.za>. 
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To ensure stakeholders’ interests are protected and considered, the Act and 
attendant regulations require members of an audit committee to be directors of 
the company and to have suitable and relevant knowledge and experience to 
equip the committee to suitably perform its duties.171 The legislative move 
towards independence is, in itself, also a move towards diversity. The notion 
behind independence is that other views, as part of those of the executive 
directors, are also expressed in the boardroom.  
The Act also requires certain categories of companies to constitute a Social and 
Ethics Committee. The committee’s duties are prescribed, and include ensuring 
that a company gives due regard to the Employment Equity Act and the B-BBEE 
Act, as well as social and environmental issues, and the integration thereof into 
strategic and economic performance.172 It can be argued that legislating the 
Social and Ethics Committee, and especially the regulation of its composition, is 
an attempt by the legislator to add diversity to the discussions around ethics, 
compliance, fraud prevention, and corporate citizenship in order that a broader 
view is taken into account by the board as a collective on these issues. 
D Summary and Analysis 
Notwithstanding the progress that has been made on both gender and race 
diversity on company boards in South Africa, particularly in recent years, 
further progress is required, and is hindered by skills shortages and limited 
resource pools from which to draw directors with the requisite skills, 
qualifications and knowledge. The over-utilisation of a relatively small pool of 
skilled directors can lead to the inability of such directors to satisfactorily 
discharge and fulfill their duties in terms of their availability and time 
commitment. This aspect may be more challenging than in many other countries 
due to the particular political circumstances and dynamics of South Africa’s 
past, as outlined above. Education and appropriate training for directors, 
including more foundation levels, have become increasingly more important in 
order to assist and drive the required changes. The IoDSA continues to play a 
critically important role in South Africa in this regard.173 It is suggested that, 
given the onerous responsibilities of directors and the potential legal liabilities 
(which have recently increased), careful consideration needs to be given to 
ensure that a person of whatever gender and/or race has sufficient skills and the 
ability to meet the legislative requirements and standards of duty. 
171 Companies Act 2008 (South Africa) s 94(4). 
172 Ibid s 72(4). 
173 See the Institute of Directors Southern Africa (2011) <http://www.iodsa.co.za>. 
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V BROADER CONTEXT 
In the previous sections we have focused on board diversity, including gender 
diversity, in Europe, Australia and South Africa or, in other words, in the 
context of specific countries or jurisdictions from different parts of the world. In 
the next two sections we focus on gender diversity in particular, but address 
some of the broader issues, principles and practical considerations. We also look 
at the mandatory gender quota debate in a broader context not linked to specific 
countries or jurisdictions.  
A The Gender Diversity Debate in Particular 
1 Underrepresentation of Women on Boards is a Fact 
The debate on board diversity is dominated by gender diversity. There is ample 
evidence all over the world that, in the past, women were to a much greater 
extent, totally under-represented on boards, and there is not a single country in 
the world where this is still not the case.174 In countries like Norway, Spain, 
Switzerland, France, Israel and the Netherlands, where mandatory quotas are 
required through legislation, this has changed in recent times and will surely 
lead to further improvements in the gender balance on boards.175 However, as 
far as we know, there is not a single country in the world where women form 
more than 50% of the boards of listed companies.176 In most countries, 
especially western countries, where there are no mandatory quotas required, 
there have been serious attempts made through voluntary codes of good 
governance to improve female representation on company boards. It was shown 
above that in Australia, in several European companies and in South Africa, the 
process of appointing more women as employees, executives and directors is 
taken seriously. Also, there is considerable investor pressure on companies to 
174 See Deloitte, above n 11; and Whelan and Wood, above n 135, 5–6. See generally, Boris 
Groysberg, 2011 Board of Directors Survey, Deloitte (2011) 3–4 
<http://www.corpgov.deloitte.com/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDe
liveryServlet/USEng/Documents/Nominating-
Corporate%20Governance%20Committee/Board%20Composition%20and%20Recruitment/201
1BoardSurvey_HeidrickStrugglesWCDGroysberg_101111.pdf>. 
175 In Norway, which took the lead in 2005 to legislate for mandatory female quotas, it was shown 
that by the end of 2010, 31.9% of the positions on the largest ASA company boards were filled 
by women, while 35.6% of such positions were filled by women in a sample of 25 listed 
companies researched by Deloitte – see Deloitte, above n 11, 21. Thus, although not at the 
required aspiration of 40% women on boards by 1 January 2008, the percentage is significantly 
higher than in any other country Deloitte included in their study. 
176 See comparative data provided by Whelan and Wood, above n 135, 17. 
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get the gender balance right on boards.177 There is solid research showing that if 
a country stops short of adopting mandatory gender quotas, there should at least 
be very specific targets set by work units within companies, particularly at top 
executive levels, to achieve gender equality.178 Thus, it is to be expected that 
more women will definitely be appointed to company boards in future. As will 
be seen below, this trend has already started.  
2 Reasons for the Underrepresentation of Women on 
Boards 
The reasons for the low number of women serving on boards can be explained 
in different ways. The most basic explanation is that company boards have 
always been dominated by middle-aged men. As board appointments are 
normally made by invitation, ‘the old boys’ clubs’ would always bring in their 
‘friends, mates and buddies’ — trying to clone and, thus, perpetuate the evil! 
However, the matter is probably more complex than that. There are fewer 
women in senior managerial and senior executive positions, and even fewer 
women serving as CEOs. Thus, the argument is that the pool from which 
women board members is selected is simply smaller than the pool of men. The 
question then is why? Here, again, the simple argument is that 
underrepresentation of women at senior levels is explained by the fact that there 
has always been discrimination against women at these levels. In the past, 
women would hardly ever have been appointed to senior executive positions 
over men in a male-dominated environment.  
The combined effect of these two practical realities has resulted in the 
assumption that there are simply not enough women to fill senior executive and 
board positions being challenged heavily. Those who argue against a significant 
increase of women on boards (especially by way of fixed legislative quotas) 
point out that there are frankly not enough qualified women to fill the board 
positions necessary to reach a threshold of 30% or 40%.179 It is then argued that 
it would, in consequence, lead to the selection of women even in cases where 
better qualified male candidates have to be rejected. This is viewed as 
unacceptable under the assumption that quality should always be the most 
important criterion.180 The problem is worse in economic sectors where female 
employee rates have traditionally been low, as in the metal or electrical 
177 Yi Wang and Bob Clift, ‘Is there a “Business Case” for Board Diversity?’ (2009) 21 Pacific 
Accounting Review 88, 89; Nicole Sandford, ‘Board Diversity: Are We on the Eve of Real 
Change?’ (2011) 35 Directors & Boards Annual 70. 
178 Whelan and Wood, above n 135, 5, 24–7. 
179 François-Poncet et al, above n 16, 454; Hirte, above n 32, 525. 
180 Daniela Weber-Rey, ‘Gesetzliche Frauenquote?’ (2011) 44 ZRP 127; Krieger, above n 73, 918. 
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industries, where the proportion of women employed might just reach 20%.181 
This raises questions about the appropriateness of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ quota 
model.182  
However, the counter-argument is very strong, namely, that the number of 
talented females is sufficient but that there is a ‘glass ceiling’ barring them from 
getting to the top.183 Furthermore, the finding that in other similarly demanding 
fields of work (eg, politics, the judiciary) women have frequently reached top 
positions, is cited as proof that there are sufficient well-qualified women 
available.184 Membership on a supervisory board (where a two-tier system 
exists) is even seen as predestined to allow for the compatibility of work and 
family life because it does not amount to a full-time job.185 Another very 
interesting point of view, expressed as part of the discussion in Germany, is that 
it is not the quality of women that has to be improved, but rather the traditional 
prerequisites for supervisory board members should be reassessed. Recruitment 
for supervisory board positions should not primarily focus on former members 
of management boards (where, as was seen above, the percentages of women 
are very low), but rather focus on females from other professions, including 
scientists, lawyers, accountants, tax advisors etc.186  
Another reason for the under-representation of women in senior management, 
senior executive and CEO positions could be that women traditionally have the 
primary responsibility for raising children, which may make the additional 
responsibility of taking up additional highly stressful managerial and executive 
positions less attractive to many women. In other words, it is a rational and 
practical career choice for women.187 However, as far as we know, there is no 
empirical data to support this claim, although it has been pointed out that many 
women in top management positions are married and have children, indicating 
that family and career aspirations can be successfully reconciled.188  
All in all, it seems fair to conclude that almost all of the arguments mentioned in 
this section have some validity. This is true especially if one takes into 
consideration that there are other measures, apart from mandatory quotas, to 
181 Kempter, above n 76, 220. 
182 Weber-Rey, above n 180, 127; Krieger, above n 73, 918; Patrick Velte,‘Förderung der Gender 
Diversity bei der Zusammensetzung des Aufsichtsrats’ (2012) 10 Der Konzern 7. 
183 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 2; EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 2. 
184 Mayer, above n 46, 919; FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 15. 
185 Bachmann, above n 92, 1134. 
186 Mayer, above n 46, 919. See also Spender, above 132, 31–4; Bachmann, above n 92, 1134. 
187 Cf McKinsey & Company, above n 67, 8: ‘Companies need access to the biggest possible 
talent pool.’ 
188 FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 14. 
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increase female representation in top management, executive and board 
positions. As was seen in Australia and Germany, the various measures are 
starting to have an effect and increased percentages of women on boards can 
surely be expected in future.  
3 Reasons for Having More Women on Boards 
Time and space make it impossible to go into the numerous reasons in detail of 
why more women should be appointed to boards. The most simplistic reason is 
that it is ‘the right thing to do’,189 but there are many other good reasons that 
Whelan and Wood list to make out a case for greater gender diversity.190 It is 
hard to deny the notion that it constitutes a waste of potential to virtually ignore 
half of the population in the process of selecting company executives and board 
members.191 Also, adequate representation of both genders on boards is 
supposed to lead to a better management culture because, this way, male and 
female points of view and leadership styles are combined, thus making better 
use of the full range of available talents and, at the same time, meeting the needs 
of both men and women at work.192 
Proponents of board diversity in general, and gender diversity specifically, point 
out that such variety brings with it economic advantages for the respective 
company.193 This is a key assumption by EU institutions as well as parties 
involved in the discussion at the national level. For example, the EU 
commission cites reports by McKinsey and Ernst & Young that indicate 
significantly higher earnings by companies with female board members.194 
Likewise, in its proposal for German legislation, the state of North Rhine-
Westphalia refers to surveys that indicate that higher earnings come along with 
an increased number of women in top management positions.195  
However, the ‘business case’ for gender diversity has never been proven 
convincingly. There is apparently ‘evidence from the US that companies with 
more than three women on their boards performed significantly better than those 
189 See Diplock, ‘Global perspectives’ in Deloitte, above n 11, 2. See also Wang and Clift, above 
n 177, 89. 
190 Whelan and Wood, above n 135, 6; Spender, above 132, 37. 
191 See FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 16; Mayer, above n 46, 919. Also see EC 
Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 3; McKinsey & Company, above n 67, 3. 
192 Whelan and Wood, above n 135, 3. 
193 See, eg, Mayer, above n 46. 
194 EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 1. 
195 See FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 16. 
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that didn’t’,196 while a Research Report from Goldman Sachs suggests that 
achieving gender balance in the workforce could increase Australian gross 
domestic product by 11%.197 It has also been pointed out that female board 
members may have a better understanding of consumer behaviour, the needs of 
customers, opportunities for companies to meet those needs and that they are 
more likely to be ‘independent’ as they would not come from the ‘old boys’ 
network’.198 However, research on whether there definitely is a negative or 
positive relationship between the proportion of women on boards and company 
performance is still inconclusive.199 Wang and Clift refer to several studies on 
the link between the proportion of women on boards and the financial 
performance of companies, and conducted their own research based on data they 
collected and analysed. They conclude that ‘there is no strong relationship 
between gender and racial diversity on the board and financial performance’.200 
This is not totally unexpected as the criteria used for these studies differ and the 
circumstances and complexities of business are such that a final conclusion will 
probably never be reached. There are, however, some studies that show ‘a 
correlation between the financial bottom line and the proportion of women on 
boards or in senior management’.201 However, the fact that the causal 
relationship between women’s representation and corporate success has not 
been proven202 is generally acknowledged by those who cite the reports.203 In 
fact, other explanations for the corporate success in these cases are possible, for 
example, boards with a higher percentage of women members often have a 
lower average age than comparable other boards where there is a higher number 
of males on the board.204  
196 AICD, ‘The Gender Imbalance’, Company Director Magazine (1 June 2010) 
<http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-
Director-magazine/2010-back-editions/June-2010/June/Feature-The-gender-imbalance>. 
197 Goldman Sachs, Australia’s Hidden Resource: The Economic Case for Increasing Female 
Participation, Research Report (26 November 2009) 2 
<http://www.wgea.gov.au/pay_equity/pay_equity_information/australias_hidden_resource.pdf>. 
198 Kang et al, above n 115, 196. 
199 Wang and Clift, above n 177, 89–91; Renee Adams, ‘Sorry, but there’s no Business Case for 
Gender Quotas’ The Conversation (online), 29 August 2012 
<http://theconversation.edu.au/sorry-but-theres-no-business-case-for-gender-quotas-9145>. 
200 Ibid 97. 
201 Diplock, ‘Global Perspectives’ in Deloitte, above n 11, 2. 
202 This is pointed out by Kempter, above n 77, 220. 
203 See FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 16. 
204 For a more detailed analysis, see Hirte, above n 32, 521. 
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4 Gender Diversity on Boards Seen as Part of the Broader 
Debate on Board Diversity 
 
Over the last 15 years or so, the debate about female representation on boards 
has been seen in the context of the broader debate on board diversity, thus, 
approaching it from a more general corporate governance angle. Several recent 
surveys deal with diversity in general (not just gender diversity).205 It is now 
well recognised that there are advantages in having a board where there is 
diversity as far as race/ethnic background,206 nationality, gender, age, industry 
experience, and educational, functional and occupational backgrounds, are 
concerned.207  
The advantages posited of a diverse board include promotion of a better 
understanding of the marketplace, increased creativity and innovation, effective 
problem-solving, enhanced effectiveness of corporate leadership, expanding 
global relationships, and avoidance of the dangers of ‘group-think’ in a 
homogeneous board.208 Diverse backgrounds and experiences are presumed to 
benefit the work of a governing body that has to deal with a multitude of 
different questions.209 However, what a board with a well-balanced composition 
is considered to be, and whether there is a ‘business case’ to be made out for 
board diversity, are complex issues with no clear answers, and diverging views 
based on a wide variety of different criteria to determine what is meant by 
‘diversity’ and ‘business success’.210 
205 Ibid.  
206 See generally Stephen Brammer, Andrew Millington and Stephen Pavelin,‘Gender and Ethnic 
Diversity among UK Corporate Boards’ (2007) 15 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 393; Weber-Rey, above n 180, 127; and Kempter, above n 77, 220. 
207 Mayer, above n 46, 919; Velte, above n 182, 7. 
208 Wang and Clift, above n 177, 89; Kang et al, above n 115, 195; Brammer et al, above n 206, 
394–6. 
209 For this reasoning, see EC Green Paper 2011, above n 35 [1.1.], [1.1.3]; FöGAbUG, BR-
Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 17. See also McKinsey & Company, above n 67, 3. 
210 See especially Wang and Clift, above n 177, 88. See also CAMAC, above n 112, 23ff; 
Deloitte, 2011 Spencer Stuart Board Index 18 
<http://www.corpgov.deloitte.com/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDe
liveryServlet/USEng/Documents/Board%20Governance/2011%20US%20Spencer%20Stuart%2
0Board%20Index_Spencer%20Stuart_110711.pdf>. 
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5 Research to be Undertaken over Time to Monitor Patterns 
and Perceptions 
It will provide for interesting research to compare current perceptions of 
directors along gender lines, that is: how male directors perceive other male 
directors; how female directors perceive other female directors; and then how 
the two groups perceive directors from the other sex. Also, it would be 
interesting to research the perception of two randomly selected groups of men 
and women who are non-managers, non-executives and non-directors to 
establish how they perceive male and female directors, respectively. It would 
then be interesting to monitor changes in perceptions over, say, a 10-year 
period. This idea was prompted by indications that male directors are still averse 
to promoting the idea of board diversity, and that it is probably linked to their 
perception that there should not necessarily be more females sitting on boards. 
Nicole Sandford provided this interesting example in 2011 of directors in 
America: 
At a recent director education program hosted by a major university, the 
nearly 100 public company directors in attendance were polled on whether 
they believed diversity was an important consideration for board composition. 
The nearly all-male audience response was disheartening — approximately 
70% said ‘no’. A familiar conversation ensued: We want the best athlete and 
shouldn’t be restricted by diversity: we believe diversity of thought is the most 
important factor. This view may have to change in the face of marketplace and 
investor pressures.211  
Thus, if the research suggested above is undertaken, it is to be hoped that in 10 
years’ time there will not only be a roughly equal number of males and females 
attending a similar educational program, but that the advantages of board 
diversity will be acknowledged, and also that the male directors will 
acknowledge the invaluable contributions female directors make to boards.212  
B The Mandatory Gender Quota Argument in Particular 
1 Positive Examples of Countries with Statutory Quotas 
The first argument in favour of quota legislation is obvious, that gender quota 
laws have achieved the desired results by increasing the percentage of women 
on boards. This fact is stressed by national political stakeholders213 as well as 
211 Sandford, above n 177.  
212 Interesting continuing research along gender lines is undertaken by women corporate directors 
— see the research sponsored by Hedrick & Struggles, Groysberg, above n 174.  
213 See FöGAbUG, BR-Drucksache 87/11, above n 49, 15, 18. 
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EU institutions.214 While the ‘success stories’ in countries like Norway and 
France can hardly be disputed, one still has to keep in mind a handful of other 
aspects. As mentioned, a positive trend had existed in France even before the 
creation of quota laws. It is impossible to determine what would have happened 
if the rules had not been passed. It seems fair to assume that the legal pressure 
contributed, at least somewhat, to the positive development in France, but that 
the quota cannot ‘claim all the fame’.215 An additional point that needs to be 
made is that there are some countries in which, despite having chosen the path 
of quota legislation, female representation is still very low (even lower than the 
EU average). Spain (11.5% in January 2012) and Italy (only 6.1%) fall within 
this category of countries. One has to concede, though, that both percentages 
have increased compared to October 2010 when Spain (9.5% on boards) were 
made up by women and there were 4.5% of women on Italian boards.216 The EU 
leader in female board representation, Finland, has reached a quota of more than 
25% relying largely on ‘soft measures’ such as ‘comply or explain’ provisions 
in the Finnish Corporate Governance Code.217 Sweden has also been quite 
successful without implementing quotas.218 This has certainly contributed to the 
fact that quite a few voices in the German discussion have expressed their 
confidence that, given some time, existing (soft) measures will turn out to be 
sufficient.219 A final notable aspect in considering the success of quota 
legislation is the way the respective quotas have been reached. This question 
demands close scrutiny and shall be discussed subsequently below. 
2 Quota Legislation and Arguments For and Against its 
Adoption 
The suggestions that there are simply not enough women to fill 30%-40% of 
board positions, and that a mandatory quota of women would lead to 
inexperienced and under-qualified females being appointed to boards, are used 
as some of the strongest and most common arguments against adopting 
mandatory quota legislation. The argument then becomes that, eventually, the 
small number of qualified women available will lead to a small group of women 
taking on positions on multiple boards.220 Indeed, such a trend has developed in 
214 EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 2; Resolution on Women and Business Leadership, 
above n 61, M.3, 5. 
215 McKinsey & Company, above n 67, 6 also expresses this as a general thought: ‘[Q]uotas 
cannot be credited with all the progress to date.’ 
216 For all numbers see EC Press Release IP/12/213, above n 23, 5. 
217 See Resolution on Women and Business Leadership, above n 61, M.6. 
218 This is noted by McKinsey & Company, above n 67, 6. 
219 Weber-Rey, above n 180, 127; Kempter, above n 76, 220; Krieger, above n 73, 918. Similarly, 
the Chairman of the German Government’s Commission on Corporate Governance, Klaus-Peter 
Müller, argued ‘no rigid quota’ quoted in Börsen-Zeitung, 14 June 2012 (Nr 112) 11. 
220 François-Poncet et al, above n 16, 454; Krieger, above n 73, 918. 
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Norway. It is reported that around 70 female managers share 300 board 
positions among themselves,221 which has given rise to their nickname, ‘golden 
skirts’.222 This development is viewed with scepticism, especially considering 
the potential conflicts of interest associated with membership on multiple 
boards.223 
Many feel that, in the light of all this uncertainty, other measures should be 
granted preference over the adoption of quota laws.224 It is argued that a closer 
look at the causes of female underrepresentation is necessary,225 and that many 
women simply are not aspiring to work in top management.226 Rational and 
practical career choices and freedom of choice generally drive women’s 
decisions to take up senior executive or board positions – not mandatory 
quotas.227 Increasing the availability of child care is a common example of 
measures aiming to change the situation.228 The European Commission has also 
stressed the importance of policies promoting work-life balance and 
encouraging the mentoring and training of women.229  
Even under the assumption that there are currently too few qualified women, a 
considerable argument can be made for quota legislation: It might be 
appropriate to tackle the problem of female under-representation ‘from the top’ 
rather than ‘from the bottom’. Women getting to top positions could 
subsequently serve as a role model for younger women.230 There might also be 
some truth to the idea that humans, when given the task of hiring or promoting a 
candidate, have a tendency to prefer those who resemble themselves, that is, 
men would generally be more likely to choose male candidates.231 This could be 
counteracted by putting more women into positions where they have at least an 
221 Balzter, above n 5.  
222 See Editorial, ‘Most of the Women who Make up Norway’s “Golden Skirts” are Non-Execs’, 
The Guardian (online), 1 July 2011 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jul/01/norway-
golden-skirt-quota-boardroom>. 
223 Krieger, above n 73, 918. 
224 Federation of German Industry (BDI) and German Association of Chambers of Industry and 
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Drs 87/11) <http://www.dihk.de/themenfelder/recht-und-fairplay/rechtspolitik/nationale-
stellungnahmen/dihk-positionen-zu-nationalen-
gesetzesvorhaben/frauenquote/at_download/file?mdate=1326108611386>; Weber-Rey, above 
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equal say on who should be hired or promoted. It can hardly be disputed that by 
increasing the number of women in middle and senior management positions, it 
will over time increase the pool of experienced and competent women taking up 
senior executive and board positions.232  
C Summary and Analysis 
There is no denying that women have been and still are under-represented on 
boards in most countries, and that is proven conclusively by all studies and 
available data. The reasons for the under-representation of women on boards are 
slightly more complex. In essence, there are those who argue that senior 
executive positions and board positions were (and still are) filled by the men 
who are the gatekeepers who make it impossible for more women to be 
appointed to those positions. The vicious cycle then is perpetuated because 
women are not given the opportunity to fill the positions, the pool of competent 
and experienced women remains small, providing another ‘useful’ excuse for 
not appointing more women to senior executive and board positions. There are 
many who argue this cycle should be broken, and some argue strongly that it 
can only be broken through mandatory gender quota legislation. Others argue 
that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not desirable and that board diversity and 
gender diversity on boards will be achieved through voluntary codes of 
corporate governance. 
If one takes all the gender-sensitivity or emotion out of the debate, there are just 
too many reasons that suggest that board diversity, and gender-diversity in 
particular, is the right and ‘bright’ thing to strive for. This is true even though 
the ‘business case’ for both board diversity generally, and gender diversity on 
boards in particular, has never been proven convincingly. 
VI CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The research undertaken shows that in Europe, Australia and Germany, the 
debate on board diversity is seen as wider than just a debate on gender diversity. 
Cultural, race, age, stakeholder and nationality diversity also form part of the 
debate. In several European countries, as well as in Australia and in South 
Africa, efforts are being made through voluntary codes of conduct to strive for 
board diversity. Gender diversity is a particular focus in all jurisdictions. 
It is not difficult to predict that in Europe, Australia and South Africa there will 
be more women appointed to senior executive positions and on boards in future. 
232 Krieger, above n 73, 918. 
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What the actual effect of that will be from a business point of view is impossible 
to predict. However, that women will have a bigger say in the corporate world 
in, say, five years’ time, is beyond dispute. That will be the case, irrespective of 
whether the problem of under-representation of women on boards is addressed 
through mandatory gender quota legislation, through targets or simply through 
voluntary codes of corporate governance. In fact, this prediction brings with it a 
huge responsibility on women to live up to the expectations that improved 
gender balance will lead to improvements. However, what exactly the 
improvements will be and whether the business case for appointing more 
women in senior executive positions and on boards will emerge clearly, is 
something that only time will tell. 
 
